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Abstract 
 
This chapter brings theories and conceptual frameworks to 
bear on the analysis of regulatory impact analysis (RIA). First, 
we introduce the reader to the different notions and debates on 
the two sides of the Atlantic. We then provide the theoretical 
justifications of RIA, contrasting principal-agent explanations 
with pluralist and civic-republican rationales, and exploring the 
key issue of rationality in rulemaking. Turning to evidence, we 
discuss empirical papers and more conceptual studies carried 
out recently, and make some critical remarks. Finally, we 
suggested how research on RIA can be usefully organized, 
covering the economic, administrative, and political 
consequences of regulatory oversight.  
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REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Regulatory impact assessment (RIA) has spread throughout the globe 
(Ladegaard 2005; Jacobs 2006; Kirkpatrick & Parker 2007; Kirkpatrick, Parker & 
Zhang 2004; Weatherill 2007; Wiener 2006). Based on systematic consultation, 
criteria for policy choice, and the economic analysis of how costs and benefits of 
proposed regulations affect a wide range of actors, RIA is a fundamental 
component of the smart regulatory state advocated by international organizations 
(OECD 2002). The European Commission (Commission 2001) has hailed RIA as 
a tool for transparent and accountable governance in multi-level political 
systems.  
RIA (or simply Impact Assessment, IA) is a systematic and mandatory 
appraisal of how proposed primary and-or secondary legislation will affect certain 
FDWHJRULHVRIVWDNHKROGHUVHFRQRPLFVHFWRUVDQGWKHHQYLURQPHQW³6\VWHPDWLF´
PHDQVFRKHUHQWDQGQRWHSLVRGLFRUUDQGRP³0DQGDWRU\´PHDQVWKDWLWLVQRWD
voluntary activity. Essentially, RIA is a type of administrative procedure, often 
used in the pre-legislative scrutiny of legislation. Its sophistication and analytic 
breadth vary, depending on the issues at stake and the resources available - the 
degree of sophistication should be proportional to the salience and expected 
effects of the regulation. Indeed, the expected effects analyzed via RIA may 
cover administrative burdens or basic compliance costs, or more complex types 
of costs and benefits, including environmental benefits, distributional effects, and 
the impact on trade. The scope of economic activities covered by RIA ranges 
from some types of firms to whole economic sectors, competitiveness and the 
overall economic impact of regulations. RIA can also be used to appraise the 
effects of proposed regulations on public administration (e.g., other departments, 
schools, hospitals, prisons, universities) and sub-national governments. Although 
                                                 
1 The support of the Economic and Social Research Council, research grant No. RES-000-23-
1284 is gratefully acknowledged. 
 3 
RIA is often used to estimate the impact of proposed regulation, it can be used to 
examine the effects of regulations that are currently in force, for example with the 
aim of eliminating some burdensome features of existing regulations or to choose 
the most effective way to simplify regulations 
For political scientists, however, what matters is a set of theoretical 
questions about governance, the steering capacity of the core executive in the 
rulemaking process, and the changing nature of the regulatory state. In a recent 
review article on regulatory politics in Europe, Martin Lodge shows WKDWDµUHFHQW
LQWHUHVWKDVIRFXVHGRQWKHJURZWKRIµUHJXODWRU\UHYLHZ¶PHFKDQLVPVDFURVV
national states (regulatory impact assessments) as well as their utilization at the 
(8OHYHO¶/RGJH 
In this chapter we review the theoretical underpinniQJVRIWKLVµUHFHQW
LQWHUHVW¶FRPSDULQJWKHWZRVLGHVRIWKH$WODQWLF:HLQWURGXFHWKHORJLFRI5,$
and the terms of the debate in the US and Europe in Section 1. We proceed by 
exploring different theoretical explanations in Section 2. We draw on principal-
agent models, but also show their limitations and consider alternative theories of 
regulation. In Section 3, we move from theory to empirical evidence, and report 
on the main findings and their implications. Section 4 brings together theories 
and empirical evidence, and introduces a framework for research. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF RIA ADOPTION 
At the outset, a theoretical investigation of RIA needs a conceptual framework to 
grasp the essential design features of the rulemaking process. In turn, this invites 
a joint consideration of regulation theories and theories of the administrative 
process, to assess the broader governance implications of impact assessment as 
tool and the centralized review of rulemaking as process.  
However, scant attention has been dedicated to the linkages between 
regulation theories and the administrative process wherein RIA is supposed to 
work (Croley 1998; West 2005a). Further, scholars tend to think about RIA with 
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the US political system in mind. Within this system, the key features are 
delegation to regulatory agencies, Presidential oversight of rulemaking, the 
presence of a special type of administrative law (the reference is to the 
Administrative Procedure Act, APA), and judicial review of rulemaking. These 
features should not be taken for granted when we try to explain the adoption of 
RIA in systems different from the US. In Europe for example, administrative 
procedure acts are less specific on rulemaking. There is more direct ministerial 
control on delegated rulemaking. And rulemaking has a wider connotation, 
covering the production of rules by parliaments as well as agencies. 
With this caveats in mind, the first logic of RIA adoption is based on 
delegation. The main political dimension of RIA lies with power relationship 
between the principal and the agent. Congress delegates broad regulatory power 
to agencies. Federal executive agencies, however, are not insulated from 
Presidential control exercised via the Office for Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA) within the Office for Management and Budget (OMB). Although we 
will return to this constitutional issue, doctrine and practice have recognized that 
the executive is a unitary entity, so there is a legitimate degree of control of 
rulemaking to be exercised by the President. A variant of this explanation is RIA 
as an instrument to pursue the regulatory paradigm of the President. Thus, one 
can argue that RIA is introduced to foster de-regulation and stop regulatory 
initiatives of zealous executive agencies. Centralized review of rulemaking can 
DOVRWULJJHUDFWLRQRYHUFRPHWKHEXUHDXFUDWLFLQHUWLDRIµRVVLILHG¶DJHQFLHVDQG
shift policy towards a pro-regulatory stance (Kagan 2001). Note that in the former 
case agencies are seen as excessively active, in the latter as inertial, but the 
logic of Presidential control is the same.  
The second logic comes from democratic governance. Administrative 
procedure is used to change the opportunity structure in which actors (the 
executive, agencies, and the pressure groups, including civil society 
associations) interact so that the rulemaking process is more open to diffuse 
interests and more accountable to citizens.  
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Finally, there is a logic based on rational policy-making. The logic at work here is 
that RIA fosters regulations that increase the net welfare of the community 
(Arrow, Kenney, Cropper, Eads & Hahn 1996). Underlying this notion is the 
requirement to use economic analysis systematically in rule-formulation (re-
stated in all US Executive OrderVVWDUWLQJIURP5HDJDQ¶VEXWGHILQHGLQ
much milder forms in European guidelines). 2 2IFRXUVHWKHQRWLRQRIµUDWLRQDOLW\
RIODZ¶RUµOHJDOUDWLRQDOLW\¶LVPRUHFRPSOH[UHIHUULQJWRSURFHVVDVZHOODV
economic outcomes (Heydebrand 2003). And sometimes rationality is used as 
synonymous of independence from the political sphere, as shown by the long 
tradition of technocratic political and legal theory in the US, from James Landis to 
Stephen Breyer and Bruce Ackerman.3 Academics have aired several 
perplexities on instrumental rationality and the possibility of direct influence of 
evidence-based tools on policy choice. Scholars of RIA are puzzled by the 
repeated reference, in governmental guidelines on the economic analysis of 
proposed regulation, to rational synoptic theories of the policy process, although 
experience has shown the empirical and normative limitations of these theories 
(Jacob et al. 2008; Radaelli 2005). Perhaps this is DFDVHRIµWULXPSKRIKRSH
RYHUH[SHULHQFH¶+RRGDQG3HWHUV Or perhaps the truth is that, as 
6DQGHUVRQSXWVLWµLQVSLWHRIWKHSRVW-modernist challenges, a basic optimism 
about the role of scientific knowledge remains embedded in western liberal 
GHPRFUDWLFSROLWLFDOV\VWHPV¶6DQGHUVRQ 
 
In the US, the different rationales for RIA have spawned a lively debate 
among constitutional scholars, political scientists and administrative lawyers 
about who is in control of the rulemaking process. In Europe, what we have said 
about logics chimes with the discussion on the regulatory state - or regulatory 
capitalism (Levi-Faur 2005; Lodge 2008). The rationale for RIA in terms of 
executive dominance over the administration can be read across two images of 
                                                 
2 Note however that, following Sunstein (2004)WKHSXEOLFFDQQHYHUEHµUDWLRQDO¶LQHYDOXDWLQJ
risks. RIA therefore has to cope with the challenge of transforming these non-rational evaluations 
into rational ones. 
3 Turning to European scholars, see the optimistic view of the role of un-elected bureaucracies in 
modern politics provided by Frank Vibert (2007). 
 6 
the regulatory state ± i.e., political control and symbolic politics. Looking at the 
UK, a leading author (Moran 2003) has found that the regulatory state triggers 
the colonization of areas of social life that were previously insulated from political 
interference and managed like clubs. Thinking of the European Union (EU), it has 
been argued that: 
The process of market-RULHQWHG UHJXODWRU\ UHIRUP LQ(XURSH «KDV
not meant the emergence of an a-political regulatory state solely 
devoted to the pursuit of efficiency and completely divorced from a 
more traditional conception of the state that would stress the pursuit of 
political power, societal values and distributional goals. (Jabko 2004: 
215, emphasis in original)  
 
However, political control can also lead to symbolic politics via rituals of 
verification (Power 1999). Given the increasing relational distance between 
principal and agents generated by de-centralization, contracting out and the 
creation of independent agencies, formal procedures replace trust and 
administrative procedure replaces informal coordination. If political organizations 
produce knowledge about the expected impact of policy to increase their 
legitimacy rather than efficiency (Brunsson 1989), we would expect tools like RIA 
to play a role in the symbolic dimension of the regulatory state. 
The open governance logic is based on changes of the opportunity 
structure that break down tight regulatory policy networks, blend instrumental and 
communicative rationality, and create the preconditions for reflexive social 
learning (Sanderson 2002). The opportunity structure is tweaked to offer more 
pluralism (as neo-pluralist notions of the regulatory state have it) or to promote 
civic republican governance ± we will return to these concepts in the next 
Section. 
What about rational policy-making and its connection with images of the 
regulatory state in Europe? Although critical of synoptic rationality, Majone (1989) 
has fleshed out a notion of the regulatory in Europe where rationality still plays an 
important role. In his notion, power is transferred from domestic policy-makers to 
EU institutions in areas in which distributional matters and values are much less 
important than efficiency and Bayesian learning  ± a point about the rationality of 
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expert-based decisions that converges with recent theoretical work in economics 
(Alesina & Tabellini 2007, 2008). Regulatory legitimacy ±  Majone (1996) carries 
on ± is eminently a question of rational and transparent processes. Regulators 
are credible if they provide reasons for their choices, support decisions with 
transparent economic analysis and objective risk analysis, and enable courts to 
review their decisions. Yet again, we find the logic of rational policy-making, this 
time linked to new forms of accountability and legitimacy (Vibert 2007: chapters 8 
and11). 
 
2. DELEGATION, GOVERNANCE, AND RATIONALITY 
 
Having introduced the broad logic(s) of RIA, let us now be more specific on the 
causal chain leading to adoption. In this Section, we present a classic rational 
choice explanation about the political control of bureaucracy. We then enter 
some limitations and criticisms internal to this explanation, before we attend to 
external critiques ± looking at the neo-pluralism and civic republican models. 
Finally, we consider the key concept of rationality. 
In rational choice theory, the regulatory process is characterized by 
demand and supply. In the regulatory market place, however, information 
asymmetries (moral hazard, adverse selection, and signaling) are more serious 
than in markets for goods and services. Principal-agent models - developed to 
explain how delegation problems are solved - shed light on the nature of RIA as 
a type of administrative procedure. 
Delegation generates the problems of bureaucratic and coalitional drifts. 
The former is a direct consequence of delegation: once power has been 
delegated, information asymmetries produce agency dominance. The principal 
can use incentives to react to this state of play, but there are empirical and 
theoretical reasons why this solution may not work (Miller 2005). However, 
agencies would still develop rules in the interest of the principals, if proper 
administrative procedures enforced by the courts were introduced (McCubbins, 
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Noll & Weingast 1989). Coalition drift arises out of the fact that agencies may 
over time produce rules that do not reflect the original deal made by political 
principals and their most relevant constituencies  for support (i.e., the pressure 
groups that entered the original deal) (Horn & Shepsle 1989; Macey 1992). 
Positive political theorists predict that the regulatory process will be dominated by 
organized subgroups, leading to diffuse collective loss.  
Following this theoretical template, administrative procedure is used to 
exchange information on the demand and the supply of regulation. The design of 
administrative procedure limits the participation of broader interest groups and 
facilitates rent-seeking, overcoming the limitations of the incentive structure. 
Indeed, procedures reduce the principal-DJHQWVODFNDQGµHQIUDQFKLVHLPSRUWDQW
constituents in the DJHQF\¶VGHFLVLRQ-making, assuring that agencies are 
UHVSRQVLYHWRWKHLULQWHUHVW¶0F&XEELQV1ROO	:HLQJDVW0RUHRYHU
WKHµPRVWLQWHUHVWLQJDVSHFWRISURFHGXUDOFRQWUROVLVWKDWWKH\HQDEOHSROLWLFDO
leaders to assure compliance without specifying, or even necessarily knowing, 
ZKDWVXEVWDQWLYHRXWFRPHLVPRVWLQWKHLULQWHUHVW¶0F&XEELQV1ROO	:HLQJDVW
1987: 244). As such, administrative procedure belongs to the politics of structure 
(as opposed to the politics of specific policy issues), that is, how institutions with 
different interests compete to control, change, and exercise public authority (Moe 
& Wilson 1994: 4). 
Administrative procedure is thus effective in several ways. Firstly, it allows 
LQWHUHVWJURXSVWRPRQLWRUWKHDJHQF\¶VGHFLsion-making process (fire alarm 
PRQLWRULQJLVPDGHSRVVLEOHE\QRWLFHDQGFRPPHQW6HFRQGO\LWµLPSRVHV
delay, affording ample time for politicians to intervene before an agency can 
SUHVHQWWKHPZLWKDIDLWDFFRPSOL¶0F&XEELQV1ROO	:HLQJDVW1). 
)LQDOO\E\µVWDFNLQJWKHGHFN¶LWEHQHILWVWKHSROLWLFDOLQWHUHVWVUHSUHVHQWHGLQWKH
coalition supporting the principal (McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, 1987: 273-4). 
Cost-EHQHILWDQDO\VLV&%$SOD\VDVSHFLILFUROH,WLVµDPHWKRGE\ZKLFKWKH
PresideQW&RQJUHVVRUWKHMXGLFLDU\FRQWUROVDJHQF\EHKDYLRU¶3RVQHU
1140). CBA minimizes error costs under conditions of information asymmetry.  
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2YHUDOO5,$DVDGPLQLVWUDWLYHSURFHGXUHVROYHVWKHSULQFLSDO¶VSUREOHPRI
controlling bureaucracies. Its position within the family of control systems is 
perhaps unique. Whilst some instruments operate either ex ante (e.g., statutes 
DQGDSSRLQWPHQWVRUH[SRVWHJMXGLFLDOUHYLHZRIDJHQF\¶VUXOHPDNLQJ5,$
provides on-going control. It operates whilst rules are being formulated and 
regulatory options are assessed. 
Some questions and qualifications arise within the principal-agent theory 
territory ± ZHVKDOOPRYHWRµH[WHUQDO¶FULWLTXHVODWHURQ)RUDVWDUWWKHUHDUH
multiple principals (Miller 2005). Consequently, it becomes difficult to predict who 
has control. Further, the intuitions about fire-alarms in regulatory policy 
(McCubbins & Schwartz 1984) were put forward to make the case for 
Congressional dominance, but the empirical evidence for Congressional control 
of executive agencies is poor and ambiguous (Kagan 2001: 2259). Even if they 
are put to work, Congressional fire-alarms are at best status-quo preserving, 
reactive, and discrete. Consequently, they cannot produce a comprehensive 
consideration of regulatory matters (Kagan 2001: 2260). 
Political appointees can be useful to the President by identifying 
preferences or by framing the policy issues (Hammond & Knott 1999). As shown 
by Moe and Wilson (1994), the Presidency as institution has several structural 
advantages over Congress, and centralized review of rulemaking has been 
successfully used to move the balance of power from Congress to the White 
House.  
However, the determination of preferences of special groups can be 
problematic. One of the majoUGLIILFXOWLHVLQ5,$LVWKHLGHQWLILFDWLRQRIµZKRZDQWV
ZKDW¶DWDQHDUO\VWDJHZKHQUHJXODWRU\RSWLRQVDUHIOHVKHGRXW0RGHOVRI
rulemaking coalitions show the complexity of preferences constellations across 
principals and clients within large coalitions (Waterman & Meier 1998). And 
perhaps the White House or Congress do not really want to exercise control all 
the time ± it is often efficient to let the agent figure out what the diverse 
preferences are and how they can be accommodated (Kerwin 2003: 275-276). 
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Another consideration is that the theory of delegation is too static without a 
theory of negotiation (Kerwin 2003:278-279). Under conditions of multiple 
principals, problematic identification of preferences, and uncertainty about how 
the courts will µFORVH¶WKHLQFRPSOHWHFRQWUDFWEHWZHHQDJHQWDQGSULQFLSDO
negotiation plays a fundamental role.  
More importantly still, the standard formulation of principal-agent 
theorizing about administrative procedure does not tell us how the agency 
responds. Here we need a model of the bureaucracy. There are professional 
differences within agencies ± scientific/technical personnel respond to CBA less 
favorably than personnel trained in policy analysis (West 1988). The question is 
not simply one of training, but rather one of different visions of the nature of the 
rulemaking process. Add that the same individual behaves rationally or morally 
depending on the changing characteristics of the environment and the specific 
regulatory interaction at stake (Ayers & Braithwaite 1992). This reminds us of the 
µPL[HGPRWLYHV¶'RZQVLDQEXUHDXFUDWVRIInside Bureaucracy. Given this 
heterogeneity, agencies can rely on different organizational forms, such as team, 
hierarchy, outside advisor, adversary, and hybrid models (McGarity 1991). This 
observation on internal organization and professional background hints at a 
possible fruitful combination of formal models of rulemaking with management 
theories (Hammond & Knott 1999).    
Normatively speaking, the notion of control over regulatory agencies has 
spawned a debate among constitutional and administrative lawyers that takes us 
beyond rational choice theorizing. The questions, often revolving around the 
centralized presidential review of rulemaking rather than the existence of RIA, 
arHµZKRKDVFRQWURORIUXOHPDNLQJ¶DQGZKHWKHUWKLVFDQEHMXVWLILHG7KH
discussion has been heated4ZLWKKLQWVRIµUHOLJLRXV]HDO¶%OXPVWHLQ 
With these remarks on the constitutional dimension in mind, we are ready 
to move on to the next question, i.e., what are the models of governance within 
                                                 
4 Some of the leading authors in this debate (e.g., Graham, Kagan, Katzen, DeMuth, and Scott 
Farrow) have combined academic life with first-hand experience in the Presidential administration 
(or got very close to it, as in the case of Blumstein, whose OIRA nomination was blocked by 
Senate). 
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which we situate RIA? Political control of the bureaucracy (whether in the form of 
congressional dominance or unitary executive) is not the only option. The neo-
pluralism and civic republican models provide alternatives. 
In neo-pluralist theory, RIA (and more generally administrative procedure) 
is adopted to produce equal opportunities for pressure groups (see Arnold 1987) 
on environmental impact assessment). Granted that regulatory choice is about 
collecting information from different sources and balancing different values, RIA 
can be used to ensure that all the major interests affected compete in a level-
playing field. Transparency and open processes of rulemaking are necessary 
conditions for neo-pluralist politics to operate optimally.  The explanation of why 
the executive adopts RIA is not very clear.  One must assume that elected 
officials want to change the opportunity structure to achieve conditions that 
approximate the neo-pluralist ideal-type. The government may want to do this 
under pressure from the median voter. As a matter of fact, Congress passed 
statues that increase participation in the rulemaking process, such as the 
Consumer Protection Act (1972), the Occupational Safety and Health Act (1970), 
and the Toxic Substance Control Act (1976). The courts have also imposed 
requirements on agency to release data, disclose the basis of discussions with 
pressure groups, and carry out public hearings.  
One problem with interest-group-oriented models ± Kagan (2001: 2267) 
notes ± LVWKDWJURXSSUHVVXUHUHVXOWVLQµEXUGHQVDQGGHOD\RQDJHQFLHVDQG
thus make them reluctant to issue new rules, revisit old rules, and experiment 
ZLWKWHPSRUDU\UXOHV¶7KXVWKHSOXUDOLVWPRGHOPD\EH± together with the 
activism of the courts ± RQHUHDVRQIRUWKHµRVVLILFDWLRQRIUXOH-PDNLQJ¶0F*DULW\
1992) and one of the problems which has led to more flexible instruments, such 
as negotiated rulemaking (Coglianese 1997). Formal requirements may also 
push agencies towards less transparency: the real deals with pressure groups 
are not done during the formal ceremony of notice and comment and other 
procedures, where the agency tends to assume a rigid defense of its proposal. 
They are done earlier and less transparently (Kagan 2001: 2267 quoting a former 
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General Counsel of the EPA comparing formal procedures to the Japanese 
Kabuki theater).  
The civic republican theory argues that under proper conditions, actors are 
able to pursue the broader community interest (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992; 
Seidenfeld 1992; Sunstein 1990). This model of the regulatory state provides a 
direct participatory role to public interest groups, civil society organizations, and 
citizens. It goes beyond pluralism: weaker groups and the community as a whole 
are deliberately empowered. Instead of technocratic decision-making, we end up 
with fully political and participatory policy-making styles (Bartle 2006).  
:LWKLQWKHFLYLFUHSXEOLFDQWKHRU\&UROH\H[SHFWV5,$WRSURYLGHµDQ
opportunity for public-spirited dialogue and deliberation about regulatory 
SULRULWLHV¶&UROH\$FLYLFUHSXEOLFDQ5,$ZLOOWKHUHIRUHDLPDWPDNLQJ
the community stronger. Regulatory choices will be less about measuring the 
costs and benefits of regulation, less about making market deals, and would look 
more like deliberation  about major trade-offs in multiple policy sectors (Ayres & 
Braithwaite 1992: 17; Morgan 2003: 224). 
Finally, one can turn to a governance model based on rationality and self-
control of agencies, on the basis of the technocratic theories mentioned above. If 
rationality means efficient decisions, for example by using CBA, this still raises 
the question why would a government want to increase the efficiency of the 
UHJXODWRU\SURFHVV"7KLVLVZKHUH0DMRQH¶VQRQ-majoritarian regulatory state 
offers an explanation, based on credibility, the separation between regulatory 
policy and other policy types, and procedural legitimacy.  
The question is that, for all the virtues of Weberian bureaucracies we can 
think of, there are also vices, notably inertia, negativity bias, and reluctance to 
modify the status quo. Controlling bureaucracy may have less to do with 
µUXQDZD\DJHQFLHV¶DVFRQJUHVVLRQDOGRPLQDQFHWKHRULVWVLPSOLFLWO\DVVXPH
than with providing direction and energy to otherwise ossified rulemaking 
systems (Kagan 2001: 2264). The prompt letters used by the OMB in recent 
years seem to corroborate this point (Graham 2007).  
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It has been argued that the OMB cannot preserve rationality in the 
regulatory process by using CBA and at the same time exercise a function of 
political control (Shapiro, 2005). However, a classic objection is that the 
President, unlike individual members of Congress, is elected by the whole nation 
and therefore will care about the broad costs and benefits affecting all 
constituencies (Kagan 2001: 2335). Presidents also care about leadership. Their 
individual interests are consistent with the institutional interests of the 
Presidency. On issues of structure the President will go for changes that increase 
the power of the Presidency over Congress, not for special interests politics (Moe 
& Wilson, 1994: 27). 
In consequence, there may be no trade-off between political control, 
effectiveness, and accountability (Kagan 2001: on effectiveness see pp. 2339-
2346). The personnel in charge of review is pretty much stable across political 
parties and administrations, thus increasing the likelihood of technical analysis, 
leaving to the President the political duty to provide overall direction to the 
agencies.  
To sum up then, this rich theoretical debate shows that rational choice 
theories of delegation provide a useful benchmark with clearly testable 
implications. The neo-pluralist and civic-republican theories have more normative 
appeal, although they are less clear on the propositions that can be tested 
empirically and the logic of introduction of RIA. Notions of rationality enter 
intervening variables in the explanation.  
Be that as it may, the value of these theoretical approaches beyond the 
US has not been assessed. In Europe, for example, RIA may be used to control 
the process of rule formulation in governmental departments. However, even if 
the delegation problems are common everywhere, the institutional context is 
different. In Westminster systems, the prime minister and the ministers in charge 
of different departments belong to the same political party. In other parliamentary 
European systems, the prime minister has to control departments that can be 
headed by ministers of different parties in the ruling coalition. The role of the 
parliament varies markedly across countries, but most systems are 
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parliamentary, not presidential (with the partial exception of France). So the 
question is whether there are functional equivalents to Presidential control, 
otherwise RIA would play a completely different role. 
 
3. THE EFFECTS OF RIA: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
One critical issue here is to work on concept formation before we move on to 
measurement. Another is to categorize and measure changes brought about by 
RIA, being aware that indirect-cumulative effects of knowledge utilization over a 
long period of time are more important than short-term instrumental use (or lack 
RI:HLVV$WKLUGFDYHDWLVWRFRQWUROIRUWKHQXOOK\SRWKHVLVRIµQRHIIHFWV
RI5,$¶$IRXUWKWUicky issue ± Cary Coglianese (2002) reminds us - is 
counterfactual reasoning: would the change have taken place in any case without 
RIA?  
A classic method for the evaluation of changes is the observational study. 
There are two types of observational study: longitudinal and cross-sectional 
(Coglianese, 2002). A longitudinal study compares the outcomes of 
administrative procedure over time; a cross-sectional study compares regulatory 
outcomes in the same period between a group of countries operating under the 
procedure and another one that does not. 
3.1 Longitudinal-quantitative studies 
Economists have carried out longitudinal and quantitative empirical studies. The 
first group of quantitative studies deals with the accuracy of the cost and benefit 
estimates. Morgenstern, Pizer, and Shih (2001) assess the relationship between 
costs reported in RIAs and the actual economic costs. They conclude that 
generally regulatory costs are overestimated, a conclusion shared by other 
authors. Harrington, Morgenstern, and Nelson (2000) compare the ex ante cost 
predictions made by OSHA and EPA in twenty-five rulemaking with ex post 
findings made by independent experts. They argue that cost overestimation is 
HVVHQWLDOO\GXHWRWKHODFNRIFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIµXQDQWLFLSDWHGXVHRInew 
WHFKQRORJ\¶+DUULQJWRQ0RUJHQVWHUQ	1HOVRQ$FRPSUHKHQVLYH
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recent literature review however, concludes that costs and benefits are poorly 
estimated in the US, but it is not clear if there are systematic biases (Hahn & 
Tetlock 2008). Recent studies on European countries show very limited use of 
sophisticated assessment tools (Nilsson et al. 2009). 
Another group of quantitative studies has assessed the soundness of 
economic analyses through scorecards and checklists. Scorecards provide 
measures of the overall impact of different regulations, relying on economic 
performance indicators such as costs, benefits, lives or life-years saved, cost-
effectiveness, etc (Hahn 2005). However scorecards ± it has been argued - 
disregard un-quantified costs and benefits, neglect distributive impacts and do 
not disclose the true level of uncertainty (Heinzerling 1998; Parker 2000). 
Checklists are a collection of quality assurance measures (generally expressed 
in Y/N format). Hahn and associates have developed checklists of US RIAs 
(Hahn, 1999; Hahn, Burnett, Chan, Mader, & Moyle, 2000). This approach has 
DOVREHHQXVHGIRUWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ¶VLPSDFWDVVHVVPHQW/HH	
Kirkpatrick, 2004) (Renda, 2006; Vibert, 2004) and to compare the US with the 
EU system (Cecot et al. 2008). International organizations and audit offices make 
use of scorecards and checklists for evaluation purposes (Government 
Accountability Office 2005; National Audit Office (NAO) 2004; OECD 1995).  
What do we know about the overall consequences of RIA (as process) on 
the final regulatory outcomes? Croley (2003) has considered correlations 
between the following: the type of rule and the likelihood of change; the type of 
interest group and the likelihood of change; the type of agency and the likelihood 
of change; the type of agency and the likelihood of an OIRA meeting. He finds 
significant correlations between rule stage, type of rule significance, and written 
submissions, on the one hand, and the frequency with which submitted rules 
were changed, on the other.  
'UDZLQJRQ0RUUDOO¶VGDWDRQILQDODQGUHMHFWHGUHJXODWLRQVSDUWLDOO\
reviewed to accommodate some of +HLQ]HUOLQJ¶VFULWLTXHV)DUURZKDVDVVHVVHG
whether OMB review has altered the probability of rejection of high-cost-per-life-
saved regulation. He concludes the type of regulation and the budget of trade-
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groups opposing the regulation predict the probability of rejection of ineffective 
regulation better than the cost-per-life-saved variable (Farrow 2000). This seems 
to corroboraWHWKHUDWLRQDOFKRLFHWKHRULVWV¶XQGHUVWDQGLQJRI5,$  
Recent empirical analyses have focused on the relationship between 
regulators and pressure groups. Interest groups seem to be able to discern which 
among several methods of participation is the most effective in achieving 
congenial regulatory outcome (Furlong and Kerwin, 2005; Schultz Bressman & 
Vandenbergh 2006, followed by critical remarks made by Katzen 2007)  Looking 
at the correlation between public comments to forty regulations and the direct 
influence of interest groups, Yackee (2006) concludes that regulatory agencies 
FKDQJHWKHLULQLWLDOSURSRVDOVWRDFFRPPRGDWHLQWHUHVWJURXSV¶SUHIHUHQFHV<HW
another case in which rational choice understandings are supported by empirical 
evidence. 
Overall, quantitative research provides answers to the question of 
rationality and RIA. Looking at the US evidence accumulated up until now, Hahn 
and Tetlock conclude that the quality of economic analysis is pretty much stable 
across time and is always below the standards set by the guidelines. It is difficult 
± they add ± to find evidence that economics has had a substantial impact on 
regulatory decisions in the US. Nevertheless, there is a marginal effect (marginal 
changes do count for large sums of money in major decisions) and, more difficult 
to prove, a deterrent effect on bad rules that we would otherwise have seen in 
the statute book (Hahn & Tetlock 2008). 
  
3.2 Longitudinal-qualitative studies  
Practically confined to the US with some exceptions (Carroll 2007: Froud et al. 
1998), longitudinal-qualitative analyses are particularly useful in detecting 
changes over the medium-long term. Since Kagan (2001), most authors agree 
that RIA and centralized review of rulemaking have been institutionalized (West 
2005b) and used by different Presidents to increase the strength of the executive 
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± although the regulatory policy paradigm may change between one 
administration and the next. 
The critics of the OMB see its analytical function overshadowed by 
political priorities (Heinzerling 2002; McGarity 1991; Shapiro 2005; 2007); others 
argue that the OMB has defended principles of cost-effectiveness and risk-risk 
analysis that would otherwise been neglected by agencies motivated exclusively 
by their statutory objectives (Breyer 1993; Pildes & Sunstein 1995; Viscusi 
Vernon & Harrington 1995). 
20%¶VFRQWURO± it has been argued - goes against the constitutional 
architecture designed by Congress to delegate power to agencies - not to the 
White House (Morrison 1986).  Others have adGHGWKDW20%¶VUHYLHZDOWHUVµWKH
division of power between the Congress and the President in controlling the 
decision making; the objectivity and neutrality of the administration; and the role 
RIDGPLQLVWUDWLYHSURFHGXUHDQGFRXUWV¶&RRSHU	:HVW64-865).  Cooper 
DQG:HVWILQGWKDW20%¶VUHYLHZKDVLQFUHDVHGWKHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQDQG
politicization of rulemaking, thus exasperating the negative effects on democratic 
governance of the politics/administration dichotomy. In the American political 
system ± they argue - the public interest emerges out of a process of decision 
PDNLQJVRµHDFKEUDQFKPXVWWKHQUHWDLQVXIILFLHQWSRZHUWRSOD\DQLQIOXHQWLDO
SROLF\UROHLQERWKWKHOHJLVODWLYHDQGDGPLQLVWUDWLYHSURFHVVHV¶&RRSHUDQG:HVW
1988: 885). 
In the opposite camp, Shane (1995) finds that centralized review of 
regulatory policy is consistent with the constitutional separation of powers - the 
issue is whether there is a specific justification for a presidential order on the 
rulemaking process. DeMuth and Ginsburg (1986) note that the President, in 
order to advance his policies, has to control administrative rulemaking of 
executive agencies.  
By now, most of the legal discussion has converged around a unitary 
position (Blumstein 2001), meaning that the executive is a single entity, so the 
administrative activity of federal executive agencies has to be controlled by the 
President. Kagan (2001), albeit dissenting with the unitary conceptual framework, 
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agrees that centralized Presidential control has increased.  Paradoxically (for 
those who see centralized control as synonymous of de-regulation) it has been 
institutionalized and even enhanced during the Clinton year. Since the early 
years, this feature of the system has appeared irreversible, with power shifts 
towards the institutional Presidency (Moe & Wilson 1994; West 2006).  
Recent studies do not question that Presidential power has increased, but 
reveal much less pro-active coordination and more reactive and politically 
oriented (as opposed to analytical) intervention than one would expect (Shapiro 
2005; 2007; West 2006). This chimes with earlier findings such as that RIA has 
been an effective means of detecting and shaping those policies of federal 
executive agencies that impact on the key constituencies of the President 
(Cooper & West 1988). Considering a more organizational and political 
framework, RIA has sometimes enabled agencies to look at rule formulation in 
new and sometimes often creative ways ± McGarity (1991: 157, 308) concludes 
± but with the dangHURISURPRWLQJWKHUHJXODWRU\HFRQRPLVWV¶KLGGHQSROLF\
DJHQGDVµEHKLQGDIDOVHYHQHHURIREMHFWLYLW\¶ 
The broader discussion around the politics of structure and the 
constitutional issues raised by the administrative state has carried on 
(Rosenbloom 20&RQJUHVVKDVUHVSRQGHGWRWKH3UHVLGHQF\¶VXVHRI
regulatory review by directing the OMB not to interfere with special-interest 
legislation (Moe & Wilson 1994: 39) and by securing Senate confirmation of 
OIRA heads, as well as more public information and precise deadlines on the 
review process. Since OIRA was initially authorized to run for a limited period, 
Congress had the opportunity to stop funding and-or ask for major concessions, 
EXWµLWGLGQRWWDNHRQWKH3UHVLGHQWGLUHFWO\LQDQDOO-out assault¶0RH	:LOVRQ
1994: 39). 
The justifications of centralized review have also evolved, from 
constitutional arguments to policy arguments about the consequences of the 
Presidential administration, such as accountability and efficiency (Kagan 2001). 
In Europe, so far no constitutional debate around RIA and executive review of 
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rulemaking has emerged ± apart from some original attempts to frame the 
discussion on the European Union impact assessment system (Meuwese 2008). 
 
 
3.3 Emerging topics 
An emerging topic in comparative research is diffusion (De Francesco 2008). In 
diffusion studies one can contrast rationalistic explanations for the adoption of 
RIA with emulation and mimicry (Radaelli 2005: 925). Specifically on 
implementation, the formal adoption of roughly similar RIA models in Europe has 
not been followed by the same pattern of implementation (Radaelli 2005). 
Economics and law alert us that transplantation is a source of inefficiency of 
institutional choice (Shleifer 2005: 448; Wiener 2006). Hence the transplant of 
RIA in political systems that do not present functional equivalents to the US may 
produce completely different outcomes. 
 Another way of looking at the different implementation patterns of similar 
policy innovations is to consider the political and administrative costs and 
benefits (Moynihan 2005). For a politician, to adopt a general provision on how 
regulatory proposals should be empirically assessed has low cost and high 
political benefits ± in terms of signals sent to international organizations and the 
business community. To go beyond it and write guidelines, create oversight 
structures, and implement the guidelines across departments and agencies is 
politically and economically expensive. Given that the benefits of a well-
implemented RIA program emerge only in the medium and long-term, that is after 
the next elections, there is an incentive to opt for symbolic adoption. Robust 
networks of RIA stakeholders, however, can change this perverse incentive 
structure and lay the foundations for institutionalization (Radaelli 2004: 743). 
Another strand of research has looked at the difference between 
academic standards of good regulation and the specific notions included in RIA 
guidelines, thus taking a critical perspective (Baldwin 2005). Others have related 
these limitations to the broader tensions at work in the regulatory state, arguing 
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that better regulation may promote the rise of a meta-regulatory state within the 
state as a counterweight to the de-centralization of regulation (Black 2007). 
Finally, there have been attempts to connect the analysis of RIA and more 
generally better regulation in Europe with the broad intellectual questions posed 
by the New Public Management (Radaelli & Meuwese 2008). 
 
4. TOWARDS A RESEARCH AGENDA 
On balance, the state of the art is not quite up to the expectations. Most of the 
studies are based on the US, and are not longitudinal. Diffusion studies and 
systematic, rigorous comparisons that take context and history into account are 
almost absent. There is much more emphasis on measurement than on theory 
and concept formation. Studies on Africa and Asia are emerging (Kirckpatrick et 
al. 2004), but there is no consolidated knowledge on how donor requirements to 
introduce RIA, administrative capacity, and the quality of democracy affect 
implementation. 
This raises the challenge of working in a comparative mode, with suitable 
research questions on (a) the process of diffusion, (b) the role of political 
institutions, and (c) the political consequences of RIA. Research questions falling 
in category (a) could usefully test the hypothesis that RIA is used to increase 
central political control versus the hypotheses of emulation and coercion. In 
category (b), RIA becomes a dependent variable, and more work should be done 
on what specific features of the institutional context have what type of effects. As 
for category (c), the research questions are whether RIA (this time as 
independent variable) has economic, administrative or political impacts, in the 
short or long-term, as shown in table 1. Cells 1 and 4 are more suitable for the 
economic analysis of RIA.  
The administrative effects include administrative capacity. In the short 
term, RIA requirements raise the issue whether an administration has the 
capacity to deal with the economic analysis of regulation (Schout & Jordan 
2008). The implementation of RIA over a fairly long period of time should leave a 
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mark on the types of civil servants mentioned by West and McGarity. Cell 5 also 
reminds us of the long-term relationship between administrative procedure and 
RIA. We do not know much about how administrative law shapes European RIA 
processes and vice versa. The political effects bring us into cells 3 and 6, and to 
major governance-constitutional issues at the core of the academic discussion on 
regulatory governance and regulatory capitalism. 
 
Table 1 ± A typology of consequences brought about by RIA 
 
 Economic  Administrative Political ± Governance  
 
 
Short term 
Cell 1 
Economic effects of 
individual RIAs  
Cell 2 
 
How RIA creates 
demand for 
administrative capacity 
Cell 3 
 
How individual RIAs 
influence the decision-
making process 
 
 
 
 
 
Long term 
Cell 4 
 
Effects on 
competitiveness and 
growth  
Cell 5 
 
Effects on regulatory 
cultures and 
bureaucratic types 
within agencies 
 
RIA and administrative 
procedure 
Cell 6 
 
How RIA triggers 
constitutional reforms 
to retrofit it to the 
constitutional order 
 
Effects on the 
legitimacy of the 
regulatory state (classic, 
neo²pluralist, or civic 
republican versions) 
 
 
 
 
At the macro level, the major research question is about RIA and the regulatory 
state. One way to address it is to go back to the different logics. Does RIA bring 
economic rationality to bear on regulatory choices? Does it increase executive 
control? Does it foster the emergence of new modes of regulatory governance, 
arguably a smart, democratic, open regulatory state?  
Let us recap a few important points. Economists focus on whether 
economic analysis of different types contributes to the emergence of more 
efficient regulation (Helm 2006).  Another question is whether not RIA per se but 
centralized review increases the efficiency of administrative action ± a point 
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where there are sharply contrasting views. An innovative way to look at 
rationality-efficiency is to ask whether resources for evidence-based policy are 
optimized across the life-cycle. A dollar invested in RIA cannot be invested in ex-
post policy evaluation ± hence the opportunity cost of ex-ante analysis is given 
by the money that is not invested in ex-post evaluation or in any type of 
assessment taking place after regulation decisions have been made.  
Other research questions concern the effects of a specific type of 
rationality at work in RIA, that is, cost-benefit analysis. In this connection, an 
interesting issue is about the long-term impact of RIA as comprehensive 
economic rationality. One of the most powerful insights provided by McGarity is 
about the conflict between comprehensive and techno-bureaucratic rationality 
within US agencies. Agencies may deal with conflict by using team models to 
integrate the two types of rationality, or by using adversarial internal processes to 
take the benefits of a well-argued defense of different ways to look at regulatory 
problems and their solutions (McGarity 1991). It would be useful to use this 
framework in a comparative mode. Different administrative traditions, attitudes of 
the civil servants, decision-making styles provide classic variables to control for. 
It would also be interesting to know if the clash between techno-bureaucratic 
approaches and economic rationality is bringing about a new hybrid of rationality. 
The most important issues for lawyers and political scientists revolve 
around political control and the overall impact on constitutional settings. Rational 
choice theorists rightly show that RIA is not a politically neutral device to provide 
more rational decision-making. We argued that principal-agent modeling should 
be supplemented by (a) a theory of negotiation, (b) a thorough understanding of 
the administrative process, and (c) public management theory to understand who 
wins the control game. One may reason that agencies get captured by the 
regulated. Majone, instead, would reason that being perceived as fair and 
relatively un-biased regulatory analysis is essential. Others would argue that 
overall there has been a decent Congressional and judicial retrofitting of the 
administrative state, and the constitutional balance is overall preserved 
(Rosenbloom 2000). Incidentally, this raises new questions about the European 
 23 
RIA architectures, in which there has been almost no discussion cast in terms of 
constitutional politics - specifically, in relation to the parliamentary nature of these 
political systems at a time of increasing strength of the core executive.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Long tiPHDJR7KRPDV0F*DULW\REVHUYHGWKDWµUHJXODWRU\DQDO\VLV
is currently in a state of awkward adolescence. It has emerged from its infancy, 
EXWLWKDVQRW\HWPDWXUHG¶It is useful to distinguish between RIA as 
phenomenon and the academic literature on this topic. As a phenomenon, 
regulatory oversight has been diffused throughout the globe. In some countries, 
such as Canada, the UK, and the US RIA has been institutionalized. The recent 
experience of the EU, where RIAs are produced and used systematically in 
policy formulation, shows that the institutionalization may take less than a 
decade. In other countries, there has been adoption followed by implementation 
problems and lack of convergence. This has led to some frustrations with the 
rationalistic ambitions of RIA: although academics have provided new moral and 
decision-making foundations for cost-benefit analysis (Adler and Posner 2006), 
most countries outside the US have implemented soft or warmer versions of CBA 
(Wiener 2006 uses the notion RIµZDUP¶&%$RUVWULSSHG-down analyses of 
administrative burdens (Helm 2006; Jacob et al 2008; Jansen and Voermans 
2006). Looking at the future, impact assessment may evolve into more complex 
activities of regulatory management. Thus, RIA activity may well feed into the 
construction of systems of regulatory budgeting and regulatory agendas (Doern 
2007). 
Although RIA as phenomenon has emerged from its infancy, the academic 
literature is still looking for the most perceptive research questions ± it is still in a 
state of adolescence, although not necessarily awkward.  This chapter has 
argued that RIA offers an opportunity to test theories of political control of the 
bureaucracy. We can get deeper insights into a key debate, originated by Max 
Weber, between theorists of bureaucratic dominance like Lowi and Niskaken, 
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and theorists of political control like Weingast. Rational choice theorists are only 
one of the natural academic constituencies of RIA. The other is made up of 
scholars who are broadly interested in developing our understanding of 
governance, and how rationality of different types affects policy-making. RIA can 
also offer insights on new forms of symbolic politics. 
To achieve this, more theory-grounded comparative research is essential, 
possibly controlling for broader, long-term consequences and for the historical-
institutional context. This type of analysis can usefully inform the debates on the 
regulatory state and constitutional change, as well as the normative appraisal of 
governance architectures. 
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